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It is generally considered at the present time that the basis
of the balance of power in the world is the capability of waging
thermonuclear war. This was demonstrated all too pointedly in the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
The specter of nuclear war should never become a reality if
the national policy of deterrence through threat of full retaliation functions
as planned. This policy depends on a rational enemy response to the
fact that American retaliation to enemy attack would in turn inflict
unacceptable damage on the attacker. But what if an enemy does not
act rationally? What if an attack is launched accidentally, or through
a misunderstanding or miscalculation? It is this possibility against
which the nation must be protected. The questions which subsequently
arise are: how is this protection to be effected, and what are its
economic and practical limits? The variables to be considered in a
possible enemy attack are many. What targets would be attacked?
How many weapons would be employed? Of what magnitude would they
be? How would they be delivered? Would they be air or surface blasts?




under various combinations of the conditions mentioned above have
resulted in data which is helpful in answering questions concerning
the type and degree of protection which should be provided. These
data indicate that in the event of an all-out nuclear attack, with
no shelter provided, many millions of people would survive the
immediate blast and heat effects of the weapons, only to be further
threatened by lethal or disabling fallout radiation which would follow.
It is this group of people that the nation's civil defense program is
2designed to protect. This protection is basically in the form of a
nationwide fallout shelter system which would shield people from
the dangerous gamma radiation associated with fallout until the
radiation intensity outside the shelter decreases to a safe level.
In support of this program is this statement by President Johnson:
While confident that our present strength will
continue to deter a thermonuclear war, we must always
be alert to the possibilities for limiting destruction which
might be inflicted upon our people, cities and industry
should such a war be forced upon us.
Many proposals have been advanced for means of
limiting damage and destruction to the United States in the
event of a thermonuclear war. . . .any comprehensive
program would involve the expenditure of tens of billions
of dollars. We must not shrink from any expense that
is justified by its effectiveness, but we must not
hastily expend vast sums on massive programs that
do not meet this test.
1 Department of Defense Fallout Shelter Program (Washington:
Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, June, 1964), p. 1.
2Civil Defense - 1965 MP-30 (Washington: Department of





It is already clear that without fallout shelter
protection for our citizens, all defense weapons lose
much of their effectiveness in saving lives. This
also appears to be the least expensive way of saving
millions of lives, and the one which has clear value
even without other systems.
As the first phase of their operations, in 1961 the Office of
Civil Defense began a national survey to locate potential public
fallout shelter space in existing structures. As of the first of April,
1965, the survey had located more than 151,000 structures throughout
the United States which contain potential public fallout shelter space
4
for more than 131,000,000 people. The total needs of the nation
are in excess of two hundred million spaces. This difference must be
met largely through the creation of shelter in new construction and by
the improvement of existing structures possessing good shelter potential.
This can be done with relatively minor changes in construction, called
"slanting, " which includes such measures as thickening walls, blocking
off ground area windows, providing additional ventilation to certain spaces,
raising window sills, and other similar modifications.
In order to further the shelter program, and to demonstrate that
low-cost fallout shielding can be incorporated into structural design
in varied and imaginative ways without sacrificing functional or aesthetic
requirements, the National School Fallout Shelter Design Competition was
held. Twenty-six winning designs from this competition were incorporated
^From the President's special message to Congress on national
defense, January 18, 1965, quoted in Civil Defense- 1965
,
op. cit. , p. 4.






into a booklet published by the Office of Civil Defense. These designs
presented a wide variety of solutions to the shielding problem, some
of them being almost completely underground, others nearly all above
ground, and others employing a combination of surface and subsurface
construction.
A recently initiated project of the Office of Civil Defense is an
investigation of the bonus capacity of shielded structures to resist the
effects of nuclear weapons other than those associated with fallout,
i_.e. , the blast and thermal effects. The object of this study is to deter-
mine how to maximize the total resistance of a structure to integrated
weapons effects, with few and relatively minor modifications in design,
without actually creating a hardened structure.
The basis of this investigation is an evaluation of the winning
designs of the National School Fallout Shelter Design Competition.
This evaluation consists of a determination of the capacity of each
structure to resist integrated nuclear weapons effects, and the sum-
marization of the individual evaluations into an overall criteria for
any conventional above-ground structure. Included in each evaluation
are the following considerations:
(1) The inherent bonus protection of the structure against
integrated nuclear weapons effects.
(2) The advantages and disadvantages of the design from the
integrated effects standpoint.




protection of the structure through minor changes.
It is the object of this report to present the problems involved,










= cross sectional area of concrete
= area of tension reinforcing steel
= width of beam
= width of contributory load area
= pressure factor
= effective depth of tension steel reinforcement
= width of exposing structure perpendicular to
exposed wall
= distance from exposed structure to exposing
structure
= width of combustible storage yard perpendicular
to exposed wall
= distance from exposed structure to combustible
storage yard
= exposure severity index
= shape factor loading force
= roof shape factor
= adjacent wall shape factor
= storage yard shape factor
- concrete strength




f = steel yield strength
f , = dynamic steel yield strength
f = extreme flexural fiber stress due to overpressure
P
H = height of structural element
H = height of exposure building
HF = heat factor
h = location from which shape factor is measured
k = horizontal stress constant
L = span length in structural computations parameter
used in determining storage yard shape factor in
thermal computations
L' = parameter used in determining roof shape factor
M^^ = maximum momentmax
N = parameter used in determining storage yard
shape factor
N' = parameter used in determining roof shape factor
P = axial load
P = ultimate axial load capacity
P = peak loading overpressure (concentrated)
m
p = peak loading overpressure (uniform)m
p = peak side-on overpressure
so
Q = resistance to concentrated loading
q = fire load index: structural resistance to
uniform loading
q = exterior fire load index
e





q = combustible storage yard fire load index
q = flexural resistance
q = shear resistance
v
q = diagonal tension resistance
y
RWF = roof and wall factor
SF = storage factor
T = fundamental period of vibration
t = duration of side-on overpressure: least width
of column
t = clearing time
c
a
t. = impulse duration for overpressure
V , = total shear acting at a distance d/2 or 0. 1 L
away from the support, whichever is smaller
W = half-width of exposing structure parallel to
exposed wall
W = half-width of combustible storage yard parallel
to exposed wall
w = uniform load
w = weight of combustible material in exposure
building
w = weight of combustible material in storage yard
X = parameter used in determining adjacent wall
shape factor




= parameter used in determining adjacent wall
shape factor




CX = depth attenuation factor
z
= ratio of compression tension steel at midspan
of beam
/u = ductility ratio
j6 = percentage of tensile steel at midspan
j6 = percentage of tensile steel at supports
e
j6 = total percentage of reinforcement






When any explosion takes place, whether it is a stick of
dynamite or a thermonuclear weapon, the basic phenomenon which
occurs is a sudden release of energy. Some of this energy creates
the characteristic flash of light, more is projected outward in the
form of heat rays, while the largest portion is used in converting the
products of the explosion into gaseous form. This ball of hot gasses
expands at a rate which causes a shock wave of compressed air to
accompany it as it moves outward from the explosion point. As the
shock wave passes an object, two effects are produced, in rapid
succession. The first is an overall crushing effect, as the com-
pressed air of the shock wave passes, and the second is a drag
effect as the wave attempts to pull the object after it.
In a nuclear explosion, the same phenomena just described
take place, on an awesomely large scale. A nuclear explosion also
includes an additional parameter in the form of radiation effects.
A part of this radiation energy is dispersed instantly at the time of
the blast over a limited area, and is called initial radiation. The





time, principally as radiation from fission products which are drawn up
into the mushroom cloud, distributed by the wind, and spread over a
wide area in the form of fallout.
The magnitude of a nuclear blast is usually measured by comparing
its energy release with the amount of TNT that would be required to
duplicate it. This comparison is usually expressed in terms of kilotons
or megatons (thousands or millions of tons of TNT, respectively). As
an example, it would require a stack of TNT the size of five Empire
State Buildings combined to equal the effect of one ten-megaton nuclear
explosion.
There are two methods used to release the enormous amounts of
energy locked in the atomic nucleus. The first of these, termed fission,
occurs when the nucleus of a heavy element such as one of the uranium
isotopes is broken up into two lighter nuclei, called fission products.
The mass of the fission products is less than that of the original atom,
and the excess is transformed into energy. If the fission process were
perfect (it isn't) one ounce of nuclear fuel would produce the energy of
one million pounds of TNT. Weapons based on the fission process
are generally known as "atomic" weapons. The second method is
called fusion, which occurs when two lighter nuclei are joined together
to form one heavier one. This process requires a great amount of heat,
so great in fact that it is available only in the energy released in a
As an aid to continuity/ a ten megaton surface burst is used





fission reaction, which is used as a triggering device. The fusion
reaction/ in turn, causes further fission to take place and the chain
reaction results in the vast release of energy which is characteristic
of a fusion, or thermonuclear, weapon.
Sequence of events.
Millionths of a second after a nuclear explosion takes place,
the extreme heat created, which is in the range of tens of millions of
degrees, causes a brilliant flash of light many times brighter than the
sun, and radiates great amounts of energy. An intensely hot fireball
is formed of air and weapon residues. In a ten-megaton burst, the maxi-
mum diameter of the fireball will be in excess of three miles. In a
surface burst, the heat of the fireball vaporizes thousands of tons of
earth, which are drawn up into the fireball as it expands and rises.
Strong afterwinds on the earth's surface also cause a great deal of
dirt, dust and other debris to be sucked into the fireball.
Thermal radiation, which comprises 35% of the weapon's total
energy (Figure 1), is emitted from the fireball in two pulses. The
first of these lasts only a fraction of a second and is a comparatively
minor hazard. The second pulse lasts for a number of seconds and
carries about 99% of the total thermal radiation energy. The first
pulse, due to the very high surface temperature of the fireball, is
in the easily attenuated ultraviolet region while the second is emitted
from a slightly cooler surface, and consists mainly of visible and





many miles from the ignition point of the weapon.
Following the thermal flash the blast wave begins to move out from
the fireball. The shock wave from the explosion travels outward at
a rate greater than the velocity of sound, creating what could be
termed a "moving wall" of highly compressed air. When the blast wave,
traveling outward as a constantly expanding sphere, strikes the earth's
surface, it is reflected, and the reflected wave which is produced is
also capable of producing damage. At some distance from the point of
the explosion, the original and reflected blast waves fuse together,
creating a shock front with about twice the overpressure (pressure in
excess of atmospheric) of the original blast wave. This phenomena is
known as the "Mach effect, " and the newly created wave front is called
the "Mach stem" or Mach front" (Figure 2). In a contact surface blast,
the incident and reflected waves coincide, and all objects and structures
on the surface, from the explosion point outward are subjected to air
blast similar to that of the Mach front of an air burst. As the Mach
front advances, the overpressure produced decreases steadily due to
lost energy and the increasing area of the advancing front. The over-
pressure acts in all directions, like a fluid, producing a crushing
effect on above-ground structures.
In addition to the overpressure caused by the shock wave, there
occurs a "dynamic pressure" which is caused by the high-velocity
transient winds which accompany the passage of the blast wave.










Figure 1 . Distribution of energy in a typical burst of a low altitude
fission weapon.














Figure 2. Fusion of incident and reflected waves and formation of
Mach stem.
—The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, p. 112.
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for very strong shock fronts, while for overpressures below 50 pounds
per square inch (psi) the dynamic pressure is considerably smaller. The
winds causing the dynamic pressure have velocities exceeding 100 miles
per hour as far as eight miles from the explosion point of a ten-megaton
surface burst, with much higher velocities nearer ground zero.
As the pressure in the blast wave decreases, it actually sinks
below atmospheric pressure, causing a negative pressure phase. The
negative pressure phase is also accompanied by a transient wind
creating a dynamic pressure, which acts in the opposite direction of
that of the positive phase. Both the overpressure and the dynamic
pressure accompanying the negative phase are smaller than in the
positive phase, and the amount of damage caused is correspondingly
less. Figure 3 is an illustration of the manner in which the overpressure
created at a particular point by a blast wave varies with time.
The nuclear radiation emitted in connection with a nuclear
explosion is of two types. The first of these is the initial or
"prompt" radiation which is emitted from the fireball and radioactive
cloud within the first minute after the explosion. The initial nuclear
radiation includes neutrons and gamma rays which are given off almost
instantaneously with the explosion as well as by material in the
radioactive cloud. Alpha and beta particles are also given off, but
are attenuated so quickly that neither is of much importance. The
initial nuclear radiation problem is a local one, as it is lethal only
































































































The second type is residual or fallout radiation, the source
of which is radioactive particles formed and carried aloft by the nuclear
explosion, which later settle on the earth as radioactive fallout.
Fallout radiation includes alpha, beta and gamma rays, of which the
gamma rays pose the principal problem. It is convenient to separate
fallout into two categories, namely early and delayed. Early fallout,
sometimes called local fallout, is much quicker to take effect, and is
far more dangerous. It is this early fallout, resulting from surface or
low air bursts, which within hours can contaminate large areas with
radiation of a sufficient intensity to be an immediate biological
hazard. Fission products from the explosion adhere to larger particles
of debris, and settle to the earth in a matter of hours. The heavier
particles settle in the first hour or two, while lighter ones take more
time, and can be spread over hundreds of square miles, depending
on the prevailing winds and height of the radioactive cloud (Figure 4).
Early fallout is that which reaches the ground in the first 24 hours
following a nuclear explosion. Delayed fallout consists of very fine
particles which are carried into the stratosphere and are distributed
in low concentrations for a long period of time over a wide range of
the earth's surface. The radioactive intensity of these particles
gradually diminishes during the extended distribution period. As
a result, the net radiation deposited on the earth by the delayed
fallout is of comparatively low intensity. This type of residual










Effect of Particle Size


































(Particle size assumed constant)
Constant Particles









Effect of Variable Wind




Particle's movement is the sum of
all winds acting on it
Figure 4. Factors affecting distribution of radioactive particles.






The initial/ or prompt, radiation which occurs during the first
minute following a nuclear blast is of an extremely intense and pene-
trating nature. It is highly lethal and presents specialized shielding
problems. However, it is dangerous only in the immediate area of the
explosion, where blast overpressures are also extremely high, and
while it would have a considerable effect in the planning of hardened
blast shelters, it is not a serious consideration outside the immediate
area of a surface blast. What must be considered is the deadly residual
radiation, or radioactive fallout, which, in the case of a surface burst,
contaminates hundreds of square miles downwind from the point of the
blast.
Although both early and delayed fallout must be considered in
protective planning, the most immediate and serious threat to the
population is present in the early fallout. The radioactive particles
which descend to earth from the mushroom cloud of a nuclear explosion
include over two hundred different forms of radioactive isotopes, each
decaying at its own rate by giving off radioactive particles and gamma
radiation. Once the fallout has stopped descending, the radiation
intensity, or dose rate, which is very high at the start, declines
rapidly as radioactive decay progresses. An approximation of the decay
rate is that for each increase in time by a factor of seven, the radiation





reaches a maximum at a point , it will be reduced to 10 per cent of its
maximum level. Because of this rapid decay rate, the period following
a nuclear explosion during which the population must be sheltered
against the effects of fallout radiation is not of extreme duration, and
in most cases will not exceed two weeks.
It is difficult to predict the area over which fallout will be
distributed and the intensity of radiation within this area, even for
a specified blast location. Fallout distribution depends on such
variables as the speed and direction of the wind at different altitudes,
the altitude and type of burst, the amount of energy released, the
height of the radioactive cloud, the nature of the ground surface and
precipitation conditions in the area. Theoretical fallout distribution
calculations assume an ideal wind blowing in one direction at a
constant velocity. Such conditions will result in a cigar- shaped pattern,
with the radiation intensity diminishing in the downwind direction and
toward the outside edges of the pattern (Figure 5). In practice, however,
the variables mentioned above come into play, and the actual fallout
distribution tends to be highly irregular, with radiation intensities
varying widely within the contaminated area (Figure 6).
Because of the highly unpredictable fallout intensity distri-
bution, and because of the huge area affected, it must be assumed
that everyone could be exposed to potentially dangerous fallout
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Figure 5. Idealized unit-time reference dose-rate pattern for early fallout
from a 1 -megaton fission yield surface burst. Dose rate is in roentgens
per hour.
—The Effects of Nuclear Weapons / p. 449.
Figure 6. "Actual" dose rate contours illustrating deviations from ideal
and the occurrence of downwind "hot spots". Dose rate is in roentgens
per hour.




B. Effects on exposed personnel
The effects of nuclear radiation on those exposed to it can vary
from death to sickness to no apparent injury at all. The effect depends
on the amount of radiation absorbed , the rate at which the absorption
takes place, and the physical characteristics of the person affected.
The amount of radiation to which a person is exposed is called the
"dose. " A convenient unit for measuring radiation doses is the roentgen,
a measurement of gamma radiation. It is very difficult to establish a
relationship between the radiation dose and the accompanying biological
effect. Expressing the relationship statistically seems to be the most
meaningful approach, as shown in Figure 7. Effects of nuclear radiation
which are not immediately detectable in the individual receiving the
dose include genetic effects due to mutations in the genes of the human
reproductive cells. These mutations may have an abnormal effect on
the children of those exposed to a radiation dose. Other effects,
sometimes not appearing until years after the radiation dose may in-
clude an increased probability of leukemia, cataracts, sterility, cancer,
and shortening of life. It is generally believed that the biological
damage due to a radiation dose is less severe when the total dose is
accumulated over a long period of time such as weeks or months than
when it is received in a few hours or days.
C. Fallout shielding
Fallout radiation consists of alpha, beta, and gamma rays. The
. alpha and beta rays are easily attenuated, and offer no external
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Figure 7. Effects of nuclear radiation on personnel. Curves show per-
centage incidence of sickness and death in a group of exposed persons,
for doses accumulated in a few days. Effects prove less severe if
accumulated over weeks or months. As indicated at bottom, radiation
sickness is usually a drawn-out process.





hazard to sheltered personnel. Any shield which is adequate against
the highly penetrating effects of gamma radiation will easily screen out
alpha and beta particles, which are usually dangerous only when in-
gested.
There are two basic methods of protection against gamma radiation.
The first, called geometry shielding, involves placing the shelter area
such that the effective distance between the radiation source and the
persons to be protected is a maximum. Geometry shielding is based
on two principles. First, there is a general decrease due to the spread
of radiation over larger areas as it travels. The dose is inversely pro-
portional to the square of the distance from the source. Secondly,
attenuation is gained due to absorption and scattering of the gamma
rays by the intervening atmosphere.
The second method, termed barrier shielding, makes use of the
principle that gamma rays are absorbed or attenuated to some extent
in the course of their passage through any material. In general, it
may be said that the decrease in radiation intensity as it passes
through a barrier is dependent upon the mass of the material between the
source of the rays and the point of observation. It requires a greater
thickness of a substance of low density, such as wood, than one of a
high density, such as lead, to attentuate the same amount of radiation.
In comparing the attenuation qualities of different materials, it is
convenient to make use of a term known as the mass thickness.





thickness, the product being the mass thickness of the material in
pounds per square foot.
As a means of indicating the degree of protection provided by a
shelter, a term known as the protection factor has been established. The
protection factor of a shelter is defined as the ratio of the radiation in-
tensity existing outside the shelter to the intensity inside the sheltered
area. Empirical methods have been developed to determine the protection
factor of any potential shelter, and were employed in the design of
the schools of the National School Fallout Shelter Design Competition.
Blast Effects
A. Effects on personnel
There are two types of injuries resulting from the passage of a
blast wave. Direct, or primary injuries are those suffered as a result
of the variations in pressure which accompany a blast wave, while
indirect injuries are those incurred due to flying missiles, or by the
violent displacement of the body itself. For a given overpressure,
nuclear weapons are considerably more effective than conventional
weapons in producing both types of blast-related injuries, due to the
comparatively long duration of the nuclear induced pressure phase.
Direct blast injuries, occurring as a result of transmission of
pressure waves through the body, include hemorrhage and ruptures of
the internal organs, due chiefly to damage at the points where carti-
lage and bone join soft tissue. The lungs are particularly prone to
damage, and such injuries are often the cause of death within minutes




expected, although this injury is probably as much a function of age
as it is of the degree of overpressure experienced.
Injuries received from flying missiles vary from simple contusions
and lacerations to more serious injuries such as fractures and bodily
penetrations, ultimately resulting in death. Injuries of this type, as
well as those resulting from bodily displacement depend on such a
large number of variable conditions that it is extremely difficult to
achieve any relationship between weapon magnitude and range, and
the injuries which would occur under these conditions.
Although the estimated overpressure required for a fifty per cent
probability of direct blast wave fatality is about 50 psi, some sort of
blast related injuries could occur at peak overpressures as small as
one or two psi. An approximation of blast effects at various ranges
is illustrated in Figure 8.
B. Effects on structures
The basic phenomena associated with a nuclear blast wave have
been previously discussed in this report ( Pages 12-14 ). The application
of scientific principles basic to these phenomena, with the aid of many
tests and laboratory studies, have permitted the derivation of certain
relations involving the shock velocity, wind velocity, overpressure,
dynamic pressure, and the density of air behind the ideal shock front.
These relations have been utilized graphically in describing the per-
^The Effects of Nuclear Weapons , ed. Samuel Glasstone (1st ed.
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Range in miles 3.2 4.4 6.1 8.5 15.5
Figure 8. Blast effects of a 10-megaton surface burst. The above figure
shows various levels of blast pressure, equivalent wind velocities, and
possible effects in the annular zones between successive range circles.
— Nuclear Attack and Industrial Survival, p. S5
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tinent effects of the blast wave at various ranges for various heights
and magnitudes of nuclear blasts. Using this information it is possible
to consider the interaction of the blast wave with structures and the
factors which affect the structural response. As structural response
and blast loading are extremely complex phenomena, exact predictions
are virtually impossible to achieve. However, by the application of
sound judgment to the information available, it is generally believed
that results of some value can be obtained.
There are two main aspects to be considered in the interaction
of blast waves with structures. The first of these is the "loading"
which deals with the forces applied to a structure by a blast wave,
and the second is the "response" or reaction of a structure to a partic-
ular loading.
C. Loading factors
In dealing with the loading function, it is usual to consider it
in two parts: first, the "diffraction loading" which is governed chiefly
by the peak overpressure accompanying the blast wave; and second,
the "drag loading" in which the dynamic pressure governs.
Diffraction loading begins when the shock front strikes the
face of a structure. Reflection of the shock front occurs, resulting
in a rapid build-up of overpressure at the building face from two to
four times that of the incident wave front. The magnitude of the
reflected pressure is affected by such factors as the angle at which




blast wave. As the blast front moves forward/ the pressure wave bends
or "diffracts" around the structure, so that the structure is ultimately
engulfed by the overpressure, with approximately the same magnitude
being exerted on the side walls and roof. The front wall has meanwhile
been subjected to the added effect of the wind or dynamic pressure,
while the back wall is shielded from it. This pressure differential
between the front and back faces produces a force tending to cause
the structure to deflect in the direction of the blast wave. This force
is at a maximum when the blast wave has not quite completed its
diffraction around the structure, with the back face not yet under the
influence of the incident overpressure. Once the blast wave has
completely surrounded the building, the diffraction loading is reduced,
and on closed buildings an inward crushing force becomes prominent,
due to the overpressure which then completely surrounds the building.
An illustration of the various stages in the diffraction of a blast wave
by a closed structure can be seen in Figure 9.
If a structure exposed to a blast wave has a significant number
of openings, or easily breached areas such as windows or light doors,
a rapid equalization of pressure between the inside and outside of the
building would occur, greatly limiting the diffraction loading and the
accompanying crushing effect. This type of structure is most vulnerable
to the drag loading produced by the dynamic pressure.
The overpressure from the blast wave also travels through the



























































































aboveground structures. For shallow underground structures the roof
loading is considered to be the same as that on the ground surface
above. On vertical walls of underground structures, where the water
table is considerably below the surface, the horizontal blast-induced
pressure is a function of the peak overpressure on the ground surface;
while for a water table very near the surface, the horizontal blast-
induced pressure is considered equal to ground surface peak overpressure,
Throughout the duration of the positive overpressure phase, a
structure is subjected to drag loading as a result of the dynamic pressure
created by the transient winds which accompany the blast front. The
drag loading is like the diffraction loading in that it acts as a lateral
or translational force on the affected structure. For overpressure values
less than 50 psi, the dynamic pressures are considerably less than the
peak overpressures which they accompany. On the other hand, the
drag loading is of considerably longer duration than the diffraction
loading, lasting for a number of seconds; while the diffraction loading
is effective for only a fraction of a second. The drag loading on a
structure depends not only on the dynamic pressure, but on the shape
of the structure. The shape factor is expressed by the drag coefficient
which is less for rounded or streamlined objects than for those which
are irregular or sharp edged.
D. Response factors




structure to a blast wave. Among the most important of these are the
structure's strength and mass, its general structural design, and its
ductility.
The most basic of these criteria governing structural response is
the strength of the structure. The "strength" of a structure in this
regard is affected by a number of factors. These include the massiveness
of construction, ductility of the frame, strength of connections, redun-
dancy of supports, and the amount and type of diagonal bracing which
is incorporated.
Most structures in the United States are designed to resist only
the lateral load produced by high winds. For design purposes, these
wind loads are considered to be static. The lateral loading produced by
a nuclear blast wave, however, is of a dynamic nature. The load is
applied rapidly and lasts for a second or more with continuously decreasing
strength. Thus the inertia of a structure, as measured by the mass, is
an important factor in determining response to a dynamic lateral load,
although it is not significant for static loading. Structures which have
been designed to withstand earthquake loading, often of continuous
design and stiffened by diaphragm walls to provide rigidity, have the
best chances of resisting the lateral forces applied by a nuclear blast
wave.
Ductility is a measure of the degree to which a material or
structure is able to absorb energy without failure. A structure which





should have as much ductility as possible. Structural steel and rein-
forced concrete buildings both have a high degree of ductility, and a
corresponding ability to absorb the energy load resulting from the
passage of a blast wave.
Methods of design and analysis have been developed to cope
with the problems of blast loading. Procedures contained in D.M.
Newmark et al Air Force Design Manual AFSWC-TDR- 62-13B (Kirtland
A.F.B. , N.M.: U.S. Air Force, Dec. 1962) were used as a basis for the
blast analyses included in this report.
Thermal Effects
A. General characteristics
Due to the extremely high temperatures in the fireball created
by the explosion of a nuclear weapon, a great amount of energy is
released in the form of thermal radiation. The effective thermal radiation
is defined as that which is emitted from the fireball within the first
minute following detonation. In surface and air bursts, the thermal
radiation is emitted in two pulses. The first of these is predominantly
in the easily attenuated ultra-violet region and lasts less than a second,
while the second pulse consists mainly of visible and infrared radi-
ations, and continues for a number of seconds, the time varying with
the energy yield of the explosion. It is about thirty seconds for a 10
megaton burst.






those of a red-hot burner on a stove. ° The heat from such a burner can
be felt at a considerable distance/ the intensity increasing rapidly as
the distance to the burner is reduced. At close ranges it is possible
to ignite easily combustible material without actually touching the
burner. Skin burns can be received in the same manner. The thermal
radiation resulting from a nuclear explosion produces these same effects
of skin burns and the spontaneous ignition of combustible materials,
but at very great ranges, due to the extreme heat created in the fireball.
Unless it is scattered by the atmosphere, thermal radiation
travels in straight lines from the fireball, as would ordinary light.
Protection from thermal radiation is provided by any solid, opaque
material between the fireball and the object to be shielded. Trans-
parent materials such as glass or plastic, however, transmit thermal
radiation with but a small degree of attenuation.
Under certain atmospheric conditions, thermal radiation under-
goes considerable scattering, and will arrive from all directions,
rather than in a straight line from the burst point. This effect must
be considered in planning thermal radiation shielding.
B. Effects on personnel
The principal effect of thermal radiation on personnel is skin
burns, with effects varying from minor distress to death. Direct
o
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or "flash" burns are a result of the absorption of radiant energy by the
skin of an exposed individual, while indirect burns are a result of
fires started by the thermal radiation. The indirect burns are the same
as those caused by any fire regardless of origin.
Burns are generally classified according to the degree of the
injury. First degree burns indicate a reddening of the skin, as in
sunburn. Second degree burns are more severe and are characterized
by blistering. In third degree burns the full thickness of the skin is
destroyed. The distances at which varying degrees of flash burns and
other thermal effects are produced by thermal radiation from a ten megaton
surface burst can be seen in Figure 10.
Another possible effect of the thermal flash is eye damage.
Should a nuclear explosion take place within a person's field of vision,
the focusing action of the lens of the eye would concentrate sufficient
thermal radiation to burn the retina of the eye irreparably. Since the
chances that an individual will be looking in the direction of a nuclear
blast at the time of detonation are small, this should not be a widespread
injury. What would be more frequent would be a temporary loss of vision,
termed flash blindness, which, due to the extreme overall brightness
created by a nuclear blast, would be experienced no matter which
direction an individual is facing. From a few seconds to several days
may be required for the eye to return to normal.
C. Effects on materials
When thermal radiation impinges on any material, part of it is ,
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Figure 10. Thermal effects of a 10-megaton surface burst. The above
figure shows various levels of heat intensity and the possible effects on
materials and personnel in the annular zones between successive range
circles.




absorbed, part is reflected, and the remainder is transmitted. It is
the amount of radiation which is absorbed which determines the degree
of damage to the material. The radiation absorbed, in turn, depends
upon the nature of the material and upon its color. A black material
will absorb more radiation and suffer more damage than a white material
of the same type. The absorbed thermal radiation raises the temperature
of the absorbing material at a rapid rate and it is this which causes
damage and sometimes the ignition of the material. As the material
is exposed to the radiation for only a number of seconds, very little
heat conduction takes place, and the heat is concentrated in the surface
layers. Because of this, thin or porous materials such as crumpled
newspaper or dry, rotted wood, may flame when exposed to thermal
radiation; while thick materials, such as wooden boards and heavy
fabrics tend to char and smoke but do not burn.
A comparison of the approximate amount of thermal energy per
unit area needed to cause the ignition of some common materials can
be seen in Table 1. It is interesting to note that a one-megaton weapon
needs less thermal energy per unit area than a ten-megaton weapon to
ignite the same material. The reason for this is that the effectiveness
of thermal radiation increases with the delivery rate. Since the larger
weapon has a longer thermal emission pulse than the small one, it
must deliver more energy to achieve the same effect.
D. Incendiary effects






APPROXIMATE RADIANT EXPOSURE FOR IGNITION OF COMMON





oz/sq yd 40 kilotons 1 megaton 10 megatons
Newspaper , shredded 2 4 6 11
Newspaper, dark
picture area 2 5 7 12
Newspaper, printed
text area 2 6 8 15
Paper, crepe (green) 1 6 9 16
Cotton muslin oiled
window shade (green) 8 7 13 19
Paper, Kraft, single
sheet (tan) 3 10 13 20
Matches, paper book,
blue head exposed 11 14 20
Cotton string scrubbing
mop, used (gray) 10 15 21
Excelsior, ponderosa
pine (light yellow) 2 Jb/cu ft * 23 23
Cotton string mop
weathered (cream) 10 19 26
Rayon gabardine (black) 6 9 20 26
Cotton heavy draperies
(dark colors) 13 15 18 34
Paper, Kraft, carton,
flat side, used (brown) 16 16 20 40
Paper, bristol board,
3 ply (dark) 10 16 20 40
Cotton denim, new
(blue) 10 12 27 44
Paper, bond, typing,
new (white) 2 24 30 50




cause fires: first by the ignition of thin, dry, highly combustible
materials such as paper, window curtains, and dry grass through ab-
sorption of thermal radiation; and second, as a side effect of the blast
destruction, due to secondary effects such as electrical short circuits
and broken gas lines. The total area over which fires could be started
is extensive. On a clear day, a ten-megaton air burst could ignite
fires over an area of nearly two million acres.
The two primary factors which govern the development of fires
accompanying a nuclear explosion are: first, the number of points at
which fires originate (ignition points); and second, the character
of the surrounding area. Ignition points are locations of exposed,
easily combustible materials such as those mentioned above. The
chances that a major fire would start because of thermal flash depends
to a great extent upon the number of these ignition points in a particular
area. The greater the density of ignition points in an area, the greater
the chance that small individual fires might combine into a mass fire.
Surveys have been conducted to determine the frequency of exterior
ignition points for various areas in a given city.^ The results of
these surveys can be seen in Figure 11.
In addition to the density of ignition points, the probability of
a major fire developing in a given area depends on such factors as
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Figure 11. Frequency of exterior ignition points for various areas in a city,




the weather , the terrain, the spacing between buildings, and the
combustibility of buildings.
Major fires are generally classified as one of two types: a
firestorm or a conflagration. Firestorms occured in several European
cities during World War II as the result of incendiary bombing as well
as in Hiroshima following its nuclear attack. A firestorm is probably
best described by comparing it to a bonfire. A firestorm, like a bonfire,
must have reasonably still air, a sufficient concentration of fuel, and a
uniform start, such that the fuel is burning all over at the same time.
The rising column of hot air over the fire fans the flame, and draws the
surrounding air into the fire, sometimes at a considerable velocity.
Extremely high temperatures are created within the firestorm, such that
almost everything that can burn does so, often from spontaneous com-
bustion due to the high air temperature, even when untouched by the
flames themselves. Although a nuclear attack is practically an ideal
match for igniting a firestorm, the requirements for their formation,
particularly that of fuel concentration, are such that it is generally
believed that chances are small that firestorms would occur in very
many American cities.
Although the probability of firestorms following a nuclear attack
is small, it is probable that a number of mass fires and conflagrations
would occur in various sections of major cities. A conflagration is





characterized by a wind-driven burning front which is constantly attack-
ing fresh areas of fuel and leaving behind burnt-out char and ash.
Although these fires may be started by nuclear weapons effects, once
they have begun they are governed by the same factors which are of
concern in conventional fires. The principal difference, which must be
considered in preparing defenses against the fires associated with a







The architectural plans submitted in the National School Fallout
Design Competition are not detailed, and were developed using codes
and construction methods applicable to the various districts from
which the designs were submitted. Because of this, it was necessary
to make certain assumptions in order to permit comparison of the results
of the blast analyses. For example, all analyses were based on a
ten megaton surface burst in order to permit comparison of the ranges
at which the various nuclear effects would produce specified damage
in a given structure. Other assumptions made are as follows:
1 . All structural systems must comply with the requirements
of either the ACI 318-63 or the AISC 1963 specifications,
or both, as appropriate.
2. All structural systems and elements can be idealized as
single degree of freedom systems.
3 . Loading functions can be idealized in accordance with
procedures contained in the Air Force Design Manual.





Design Manual can be employed for structural systems
and elements as appropriate.
5. Blast analyses are conducted only for those structural
elements which are essential to the structure.
6. Certain parameters are assumed to be consistent for all
analyses / which include the following:
a. The depth attenuation factor, CX = 1; i_.e. , it is
assumed that there is insignificant attenuation of
vertical pressure with depth in the soil.
b. The horizontal stress constant, k = 0.5. Since
negligible information is available on the soil
conditions surrounding those structures extending
beneath the ground surface, a ratio of horizontal
to vertical soil pressure of 0.5 is assumed.
c. The ductility ratio (or response parameter), u = 1.3,
3, or 5 depending on the element being analyzed.
d. The dynamic steel yield strength, L = 50,000 psi.
e. The dynamic concrete strength, f*. = 5,000 psi.
B. Basic procedure
The specific procedure employed in the blast analyses is
outlined below.
1. Identify the structural elements and/or systems which






a. roof and floor systems
b. exterior walls and/or columns
c. interior partitions and/or columns
d. building frames
2. Analyze the elements or systems identified. If required
dimensions or details are lacking, determine what would
be required for compliance with the appropriate code.
The analysis of a given element involves the following
steps:
a. Compute the resistance of element or system, q
(or Q) , as appropriate.
b. Compute the period of vibration, T, of element or
system.
c. Prepare the loading function. This step is generally
a trial and error process since the peak blast pressure
P~ (or P ) is not known in advance.m m
d. Obtain the peak pressure or load, p (or P ) , and
m rn
check against that assumed in step c. If the values
agree, proceed to step e.; if not, repeat steps c.
and d.
e. Determine the side-on overpressure (Pso) consistent
with p (or P ) obtained in step d. above.
*m m
f. Determine range (from a ten megaton surface burst)





3. Identify the "weak links" in the design and determine
what steps might be taken to achieve a "balanced" design.
4. Summarize the analysis.
One of the problems related to the blast analyses is the effect
of the "openness" of a building on its blast loading. An "open" structure
is one which permits the shock wave to enter, i_.e. , blast exclusion
devices are not provided. In general, the open wall area of the buildings
analyzed is less than thirty per cent of the gross wall area and therefore
the structures were assumed to be "closed" for purposes of determining
11
loading functions for the structural analyses.
Although the structures were conservatively considered to be closed
for purposes of structural analyses, there are some openings in the
buildings which would permit the shock wave to enter to some degree.
The loading on interior partitions and occupants depends upon the
degree to which the shock wave retains its characteristics after
entry, which in turn are a function of the size of the opening, the
size of the shelter, and the orientation of the opening with respect
12
to the direction of shock propagation. For purposes of determining
the loading on interior partitions and occupants it was assumed that
the pressure-time function inside would be characterized by a relatively
slow rise from the ambient atmospheric pressure to the peak side-on
nN.M. Newmark et al. , Air Force Design Manual AFSWC-TDR-
62-138 (Kirtland A.F.B. , N.M.: U.S. Air Force, December, 1962), p. 5-11.
12




overpressure existing outside the structure. The overpressure inside
was assumed to decay with time as the side-on overpressure outside.
C. Structural deficiencies as designed
In this context, a deficiency is defined as a choice of a
structural material , system, or detail which reduces the blast resistance
level of the structure below that which could be obtained through a
minor change in design at relatively little expense. It is recognized that,
had the design competition required consideration of blast resistance
,
the designers would probably not have selected the material, system,
or detail which is criticized.
The most common structural deficiencies in terms of blast
resistance were the employment of:
1 . concrete block exterior walls
2. concrete block interior partitions
3. concrete block, brick, or stone free-standing radiation
shields
4. glass partitions, skylights, or clerestories in the walls
or roof adjacent to or over the shelter area.
Non-load-bearing walls of block, brick, or stone have negli-
gible resistance to lateral pressure and should not be used. According
to theory and experimental evidence, load-bearing concrete block walls,
eight to twelve inches thick and unreinforced, can withstand an
incident shock overpressure of only 2 to 3 psi. 13 It is possible
L 13 Effects of Nuclear Weapons , op . cit. , p. 163.

47
to increase the resistance of block walls by reinforcing them. However,
at this stage, the use of a reinforced concrete wall of the same mass
thickness would probably be less expensive. These observations may
be seen more clearly in the analysis which follows.
Consider a 12 inch block wall with a mass thickness of about
85 psf. If unreinforced, its resistance to lateral overpressure is



















A = 81 in 2
I = 1575 in4
Z = 263 in3
Figure 12. Assumptions for analysis of concrete block wall

48
Under a dead load of 6100 pounds from the roof, the stress in
a block at the top of the wall would be 75 psi. The stress in a block
at the base, including the weight of the wall, would be 89 psi.
Assuming the wall to be hinged at top and bottom, the maximum moment




Mmax = the maximum moment produced in the wall
w = the uniform load on the assumed wall section, in
this case, 18 p, where p is the lateral pressure
L = height of the wall
Assuming that the block wall has no tensile strength, and that
failure occurs when the compressive stress at the extreme fiber has
been reduced to zero, the value of lateral pressure required to cause
failure may be expressed as




p = lateral overpressure on the wall
f_ = extreme fiber stress due to the axial load
Z = section modulus of the assumed section
L = height of the wall
3
For values of f = 89 psi, Z = 263 in. and L = 144 in.;





If the roof is subjected to an overpressure level sufficient to
raise the stress in the wall to 1800 psi, the wall would be able to
withstand a lateral overpressure of 4.5 psi. This corresponds closely
to an incident side-on overpressure of about 2 psi before reflection.
It is apparent that vertical reinforcement would further increase
the resistance of the wall to lateral pressure. However, a reinforced
concrete wall thickness of only 7 inches is required to achieve the same
mass thickness. Assuming that the reinforced concrete wall is contin-
uous at top and bottom, and that its height is less than one half its
length, the yield resistance of the wall may be expressed as




qr = fLexural resistance of the wall
0f = percentage of tensile steel at midspan
# = percentage of tensile steel at the supports
f, = yield stress of reinforcing steel
d = effective depth of assumed section
L = height of wall
Assuming that the area of tensile steel is 1.5 per cent of the
gross cross sectional area of the wall, that f , = 50,000 psi,
d = 5.5 in. and L = 144 in.; then q = 15.6 psi.
This resistance, assuming a step pulse and allowing for plastic
deformation, corresponds to a reflected overpressure of about 14 psi,
i




or an incident overpressure of about 6 or 7 psi, depending on the
ratio of the stagnation time to the fundamental period of vibration of the
wall.
It is possible to design such a wall element to withstand an
incident overpressure of 10 psi. It is necessary only to increase the
depth of the member or the steel area provided, or both.
The use of a free-standing block, brick or stone wall as a
shield ;.s not a feasible solution to the radiation shielding problem if
the structure is also to resist any appreciable blast overpressure. The
wall would simply no longer be there when it was needed. Also, such
walls could act as obstructions to exterior fire fighting operations.
While it is possible to design a reinforced concrete wall which
would stand up under overpressures in the range of those which the
school structures themselves can withstand, it is more reasonable to
incorporate the required mass thickness in the walls of the structure
itself.
No analysis is required to establish that as the result of a
shock wave flying glass fragments could become a significant missile
hazard to shelter occupants. It is possible to protect the occupants
from this hazard through such means as heavy drapes or sliding or
rotating panels. However, such protection methods rely on design
features which require some positive action on the part of the shelter
occupants. To be effective, such mechanisms must be maintained




be trained to close them quickly in an emergency. It is preferable that
this type of protection should be of passive rather than active nature
,
an example being the use of baffles. Baffling has the added advantage
of offering protection from thermal radiation and this concept is used
successfully in several of the school designs.
Thermal Analysis
A. Basic assumptions
The architectural plans which are the basis of this investigation
were developed using fire and building codes applicable to the various
districts from which the designs were submitted. In order to maintain
continuity in this study, it was necessary that certain generalizations
and assumptions be made. As an example/ the principal references
used for all analyses were the National Building Code , recommended
by the National Board of Fire Underwriters (New York: 1955) and the
Fire Protection Handbook , ed. G.H. Tryon (12th ed.; Boston: National
Fire Protection Association). Other references consulted are listed
in the bibliography.
Since the plans were not detailed, certain design assumptions
were made as required for analysis. These assumptions dealt with
such matters as room contents, window details, and specific items
relevant to the building being analyzed. Assumptions made which
are applicable to all buildings are as follows:




(1) thermal radiation, (2) blast effects, with the possibility
of secondary fires, (3) radioactive fallout, and simultaneous
hazard to the shelter from exposure fires. These events
are sequential and separated by an interval of time.
2. The major fire-fighting effort will take place between
the time of the blast effects and the arrival of radioactive
fallout.
3. There will be no fire storm following the attack, but
fires will be widespread and numerous.
4. All structures conform to Section 703, Fire Resistive
Construction Type B (NBFU). Noncombustible construction
is acceptable, but fire resistive construction is preferred.
5. The fire load 5 for the fire resistive building will approxi-
mate 5 psf with an assumed heat potential of 40,000
BTU/sq. ft. (contents, finished flooring, interior finish
and trim) and an equivalent fire rating of thirty minutes.
This fire load does not hold for hazardous areas, where
it is variable.
6. Practical assumptions are made in cases not covered by
present codes (e_.c[. , underground educational spaces).
7. With the exception of windowless and underground buildings,
5The fire load is the weight of combustible materials per square
foot of floor area.
"Hazardous areas are those of greater than normal fire load,
or those where ignition of fires is most likely to take place.

53
smoke venting will be provided primarily by doors and
windows.
In the event of a nuclear attack, fallout shelters would be
threatened by fires which can be placed in three basic categories:
First, fires resulting from ignition by direct thermal radiation from
the nuclear blast; second, fires resulting from exposure to flames in
the surrounding area; third, fires initiating within the shelter, as a
result of either blast damage or accidental ignition.
B. Criteria to resist direct thermal ignition
Although the approximate amount of thermal energy required
for the ignition of certain specific materials has been established,
the wide range of materials and conditions which could be involved
permits only a qualitative appraisal of the thermal ignition problem.
Whether a combustible material will ignite and continue to burn after
exposure to thermal energy resulting from a nuclear explosion is
dependent on a number of factors, of which the thickness and color
of the material are predominant. As the line-of- sight thermal rays
are attenuated by solid noncombustible materials, the most obvious
means of protection from thermal radiation is through the use of barriers
and the selection of noncombustible materials for furnishings and
construction.
In the analysis of the plans, interior areas opposite windows
have been carefully examined with the thermal rays coming from any




prevention of ignition to the interior of the building is a function of
the exposed materials and the size, shape, and location of the exterior
openings. Rays sketched on the plan and elevation views where
openings appear indicate the extent to which the interior of the structure
is exposed to thermal radiation. Exterior walls of fire resistive
construction are not affected by thermal rays.
Figure 13 illustrates a typical room situation with windows to
the outside and a door on the opposite wall. It can be seen that
thermal radiation could impinge on almost all parts of the room. Ignition
could take place in the carpeting, furniture, paper and other room
furnishings. The thermal resistance of this room could be improved
through the use of barriers to limit the amount of thermal radiation
entering the room, and by substitution of noncombustible materials
where possible. The use of barriers can be incorporated in a number of
ways, and is essentially a function of the architectural design. Raising
the sill height and extending projections over the windows are most
effective from this standpoint without recourse to actual removal of the
window. The use of drapes can also be quite effective, and they should
be of relatively heavy material which is preferably noncombustible.
Combustible drapes should be wetted down prior to exposure, which
will cause the thermal energy to be dissipated in heating the water in
the drapery material.
To remove or eliminate the ignition points attention is primarily
focused on thin materials 9 Included are paper, chair upholstery fabrics,
L

Figure 13. Combustible Material in Room
Panelled Walls of 1/4" Veneer
Carpeting
Wood Window Frames










curtains, and carpeting. It is desirable to limit all combustible material
in the room as well as that which is easily ignited and acts as a
"match" or ignition point. Heavy drapes, as mentioned above, may be
substituted for the curtains. A noncombustible carpet, substitution of
metal for wood in the window frames, and an alternate treatment of the
walls of the room to eliminate the veneer will materially reduce the
fire load in the room.
Should it happen that the contents of the room ignite due to
thermal impingement the fire must be contained and self-help measures
employed to combat the fire, or, in the absence of fire fighting, the
fire should burn out without endangering the rest of the building. Of
principal concern in this regard is the door opening to the remainder
of the building. The required fire resistance of the door, as well as
the partitions, is based on the fire load in the room. Assuming that
the fire load of this room is 5 psf , all elements of the compartment
17
with the exception of the windows should have a minimum fire rating
of half an hour.
C. Criteria to resist ignition from exposure fires
The factors which affect ignition of the interior of a building,
or the structure itself, are similar whether the source of heat is thermal
radiation from a nuclear explosion, or an adjacent burning structure
which may have been ignited by thermal radiation or blast effects.
L





The major difference lies in the delivery rate of the thermal energy.
The transfer of heat by an exposure fire is sustained over a relatively
extended period of time, while the thermal flux attending a nuclear
blast, although more intense, is transmitted in a number of seconds.
Ignition of an exposed building depends on such factors as the
temperature of the exposing fire, the total heat produced, the atmospheric
conditions, the wind velocity and direction, the type of construction,
the protection of openings, and the proximity and extent of the exterior
fire with respect to the exposed building. Firebrands are an additional
hazard, but lack of data makes it difficult to assess their effects. This
hazard can be limited through use of fire resistive roof construction.
Energy is transported from exposure fires through radiation, and
in some cases, convection. Procedures have been developed which
permit good quantitative estimates of the possible hazard to a building
due to the transfer of energy from exposure fires by radiation. The
factors affecting convective heat transfer, however, are subject to
greater variations than those of the radiation mode and require treatment
of a more qualitative nature. Where the relationship between structures
is such that the exposed building is above the exposing building and
convective heat transfer could be serious, experience and judgment
must be exercised in the absence of a quantitative solution to the
problem.
The amount of radiation energy arriving at a point of an exposed





posure severity index (E ) and is measured in terms of hours. The
exposure severity is dependent on the solid angle subtended at a
point by the flames and on the emissive power of the flames. The
solid angle measures the field of view of a detector occupied by the
radiating surface. The "shape factor" (F) is the solid angle expressed
as a percentage of the field of view and is used in calculations concerned
with heat radiation from exposure fires. The emissive power of a fire
is measured in terms of the amount, type, and distribution of available
fuel, and is termed the fire load index (qe ) with units of pounds per
square foot.
The basis in establishing a combustion criterion for a building
exposed to heat radiation is the relationship between the exposure











E„ = exposure severity index in hours
F = shape factor
q = exterior fire load index, psf
When E has been calculated for a particular exposure fire
situation, it can be compared to the fire resistance rating of various
building materials (Table 2) and therefore serve as an ignition
criterion for the exposed building.
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The principal heat sources in considering exposure fires fall
into four categories: (1) Flammable liquid exposure; (2) Combustibles
in the surrounding yard areas; (3) Walls of adjacent buildings; and
(4) Roofs of adjacent buildings.
Gas or liquid storage tanks may rupture when subject to the
blast effects of a nuclear explosion/ or they may become a fire hazard
in some other way. In the case of storage tanks, parameters concerning
the size of the fire area are difficult to determine after a tank has
ruptured, making exposure fire calculations difficult. Tanks should
be separated from other installations by a distance which varies with
the size of the tank. The ground should slope away from buildings
housing shelters, especially in the case of underground or basement
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"Fire Safety to Life, Classification Guide for Fallout Shelters"





As the exposure severity index (E ) depends on the exposure
potential of the surrounding yard areas, the walls of adjacent buildings
,
and the roofs of adjacent buildings, the contribution of each of these
sources is calculated separately with the summation of these three
being the total exposure severity index which serves as the combustion
criterion for a building exposed to heat radiation.
Calculation of the Exposure Load Index (qg )
The exposure potential of combustibles stored in an adjacent yard
depends upon the amount and the type of combustibles, as well as the
manner in which they are stored. The relationship of these various
factors is described by the equation:
qey = (HF) (SF) (wey) (6)
where
qey = Exposure load index for yard storage, psf
HF = Heat factor, wood equivalent (Table 4)
SF = Storage factor (Table 5)
w = Weight of combustible material, psf of yard
The exposure potential of an adjacent exposing building depends
on the total weight of combustibles in the building, including any
combustible portion of the building itself. It is assumed that the
fire is uniformly distributed throughout the building, with the roof
and walls considered as uniformly radiating surfaces. Dividing the





(exterior walls and roof) decides the exposure load (w , ).
As an example of calculating the exposure load consider a
building 100 feet by 200 feet in plan and 32 feet high containing 400,000
pounds of combustible materials. This building would have an exposure
load of 400,000/(100 x 200 + 32 x 600) = 10 psf.
In determining the exposure load index of an exposing building
with a given exposure load, the fire resistance of its roof and walls,
the number of openings in the exterior walls, and the average wood
equivalent of its combustible materials are taken into account. The
governing equation is:
qeb = (RWF)(HF)(web ) (?)
where
q , = Exposure load index for exposing building, psf
RWF = Roof and wall factor (Table 9)
HF = Heat factor (average wood equivalent of exposing
building and contents, from Table 4)
w . = Weight of combustible material, psf of building
surface
It may be seen that the adjustment factor does not reduce the exposure
in direct proportion to the percentage of opernings. This is accounted
for by the spread of flames from the openings.
Buildings which extend above the exposure building are subject
to hot gasses which are forced upward from the burning building. The





which should result in a reasonable separation severity relationship
based on fire protection experience.
Calculation of the Shape Factor (F)
The shape factor is used to describe conveniently the separation
and size of the exposing fire. It is essentially a measure of the degree
to which the field of view of a detector is occupied by the radiating
surface.
As illustrated in Figure 14, structure A, the exposed building,
receives energy from structure B and the adjacent storage yard. The
maximum incident heat flux on the exterior wall of structure A is
evaluated by use of the shape factor for any desired height, h
a
. Re-
ferring to the plan view, the shape factor will be a maximum at the
point where the extension of the center line of the exposing surface
intersects the exterior wall of building A. Equations are given for the
shape factor from h to the yard, roof, and facing exterior wall of
a
structure B.
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The shape factors Fd and Fd are read from Table 7. The parameters
needed to enter the table are calculated as shown below, using
























The roof shape factor, used to evaluate the exposure to the
floors of the exposed building which are above the roof of the exposure
building is:
F
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The needed parameters are calculated as shown below, using information
obtained from Figure 14:




N^ = dQ/Wb (18)
L' = (h - HJ/W, (19)abb
The method for obtaining the shape factor for adjacent walls is
divided into two cases. Case 1 is used when h is less than H, and
a d
case 2 is used when h is greater than H, (Figure 14).
a o
Case 1 , h less than H, :
a b
where
F = F + F Q (20)w 1 z
F, = fCX.Yj F. = O for h =0 (21)





2 "WJ F 2 =Oforha=Hb (22)
The shape factors F and F are read from Table 8. The needed
parameters are calculated as shown below, using information obtained
from Figure 14.
x
i Vd <23 >
Yj = ha/do (24)
Y
2 " <
Hb " ha»/do (25)
Case 2, h greater than H, :
a b
Fw - Fj - F 2 (26)
where the shape factors F and F are calculated in the same manner
as in case 1
.
The equations listed above permit calculation of the approximate
total exposure severity to which a building could be subjected. This
result can be used as a criterion for estimating the structural fire
resistance required of a building to prevent ignition by exposure fires.
D. Criteria to resist interior fires
The amount, type, method of storage, and distribution of
combustibles are the principal influences which determine the interior
fire hazard to a building. In order to arrive at some value for fire
resistance, the fire potential and its relationship to the expected
fire severity must be considered.
In order to determine the expected fire severity, it is necessary




building are seldom distributed uniformly over a floor area, and the fire
duration and intensity in an area, which is based on the average fire
load, may be much higher than expected due to concentration of the
combustibles. Some basic rules which aid in minimizing this effect
are the following:
1. If the fire load over a floor area of 10 square feet does
not exceed twice the average and the contents are
reasonably distributed, the average fire load can be
used.
2. When less than 10 per cent of the floor area is loaded
to less than three times the remainder, the average
fire load can be used.
3. When more than 60 per cent of the fire area is covered
with a higher load, the higher load should be used
rather than the average.
The relationship which exists between fire load and fire severity
has been established for fire resistive structures with combustibles
having a calorific value in the range of wood and paper. The probable
duration and intensity of the resulting fire are graphically presented in
Figure 15 and Figure 16, respectively.
The adjusted fire load, or the fire load index, is calculated
using the following equation:





q = Interior fire load index, psf
w = Weight of combustible material, psf of floor area
HF = Heat factor (Table 4)
SF = Storage factor (Table 5)
The fire load index is converted to the fire severity by use of
Figure 15. Figure 15 was developed from results of test fires in fire
resistive structures using wood and paper for combustibles, and may
be somewhat inaccurate for certain types of combustibles, although the
introduction of heat and storage factors to modify the fire load makes
use of the figure reasonable.
The fire severity calculated should be rounded off to the nearest
half hour when greater than one hour, and to the nearest quarter hour
when less than one hour. The fire severity index represents an
estimate of the structural fire resistance required of the building
elements to prevent the disastrous spreading of interior fires.
Radiation Analysis
One of the criteria of the National School Fallout Shelter
Design Competition was that all schools should be designed to provide
a protection factor of at least 100. This protection factor was incor-
porated into the designs by methods established in Office of Civil
Defense Publications, Guide for Architects and Engineers , or Design
and Review of Structures for Protection from Fallout Gamma Radiation .
Thus there was no need to conduct a radiation protection analysis
i of the schools as they were presented.
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Where design changes were recommended to improve a specific
school's resistance to integrated nuclear weapons effects , analyses
were conducted to determine if any significant changes in protection
factor would result. These analyses were conducted using the
Protection Factor Estimator TM 64-1/ May 1964/ published by the

























Figure 14. Location of External Exposure
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** Nonload-bearing wall restrained on all edges.






RELATION OF FIRE LOAD TO FIRE SEVERITY
Average Weight of Fire Severity, hrs
Combustibles/ psf of Standard Time-









*Data applies to fire resistive structures with combustibles
having a calorific value in the range of wood and paper (including






























































Loose/ Piled in Compact,







Products 1.4 1.0 0.5
Paper 1.7 1.2 0.6
Coke 0.8 0.3 0.2
Coal 1.0 0.6 0.4
Peat, Charcoal 0.8 0.6 0.5
Silk 1.4 0.9 0.6
Cotton 1.2 0.8 0.5
Wool 0.8 0.6 0.4
Rubber, Plastics 1.3 1.0 0.7
Nitrcellulose
Celluloid 4.0 3.0 2.0
Grain 1.0 0.8 0.6
Flour 0.9 0.7 0.5




EFFECTIVE COMBUSTIBLE CONTENTS OF STEEL CONTAINERS
Part of Combustibles in Containers
No Containers 1.00 1.00 1.00
Backed and Partitioned
Shelving 0.75 0.75 0.75
Shelving With Doors
and Transfer Cases 0.60 0.50 0.25
Filing Cabinets and
Desks 0.40 0.20 0.10
Safes and Cabinets of
1-hour or More Fire-




Than Half to Than







TABLE OF SHAPE FACTORS FOR EXPOSURE BY ADJACENT YARD OR ROOF FIRE
L/N 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 10.0 20.0
0.00 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50
0.02 .31 .40 .45 .47 .48 .49 .49 .49 .49 .49 .49 .49
0.05 .15 .28 .38 .44 .46 .47 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48
0.10 .05 .15 .27 .38 .41 .44 .46 .47 .47 .47 .47 .47
0.2 .01 .05 .15 .27 .34 .37 .42 .43 .44 .44 .44 .44
0.4 .01 .05 .14 .21 .35 .37 .38 .38 .38 .38 .38
0.6 .01 .02 .08 .13 .21 .29 .31 .32 .33 .33 .33
1.0 .01 .03 .06 .11 .19 .23 .24 .25 .25 .25
2.0 .01 .01 .02 .07 .12 .13 .14 .15 .15
4.0 .02 .04 .05 .07 .07 .08
6.0 .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .05







TABLE OF SHAPE FACTORS FOR EXPOSURE BY ADJACENT WALL FIRE
X/Y 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 10.0 20.0
0.1 .00 .01 .01 .
0.2 .00 .01 .02 .
0.4 .00 .02 .05 .
0.6 .00 .03 .06 .
1.0 .00 .04 .08 .
2.0 .00 .05 .10 .
4.0 .00 .05 .10 .
6.0 .00 .05 .10 .
10.0 .00 .05 .10 .
20.0 .00 .05 .10 .
oo
.00 .05 .10 .
02 .03 .04 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
05 .06 .08 .09 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10
08 .11 .15 .18 .18 .19 .19 .19 .19
11 .15 .21 .25 .25 .26 .26 .26 .26
15 .21 .28 .33 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
18 .25 .33 .41 .44 .44 .45 .45 .45
18 .25 .35 .44 .47 .48 .48 .48 .49
19 .26 .35 .44 .48 .49 .49 .49 .49
19 .26 .35 .45 .48 .49 .50 .50 .50
19 .26 .35 .45 .48 .49 .50 .50 .50




ROOF AND WALL FACTOR
1
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In order to illustrate the methods of analysis described in the
previous chapter a typical evaluation of one of the designs of the
National School Fallout Shelter Design Competition is presented. The
chosen design for the sample evaluation is the second prize winner
from Region 7. The elevation and plan views are shown in Figures 17
and 18, respectively.
Blast Evaluation
This design employs a core-type shelter, in which the classrooms
surround the shelter area. The structure consists essentially of a
reinforced concrete roof system supported by brick bearing walls on
the perimeter and by a system of brick bearing walls, reinforced beams,
and columns in the interior. For the purposes of this analysis it is
assumed that only the core shelter area need be designed to withstand
blast overpressure. This assumption will result in leaving the exterior
architectural treatment essentially unchanged. The grouted brick walls
which are specified in this design have very low resistance to blast
overpressures, and they must be redesigned using reinforced concrete
construction in order to achieve a significant degree of blast resistance.
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gypsum board as shown in the drawings.
The procedure employed in the blast evaluation is that outlined
in the previous chapter. The response of the various structural
elements to their loading functions is determined so that failure in
the flexural mode, rather than in one of the more brittle modes, is
insured.
In the interest of brevity, the blast evaluation is limited to one
example of each of the principal structural elements of the shelter.
These elements are: the roof slab, the supporting beams, the bearing
walls and the columns. For special cases, the Air Force Design Manual
should be consulted.
A. Roof slab
The original design of the roof over the multipurpose room calls
for 24-inch single Tees with a 10-inch concrete fill. This design was
presumably intended to take advantage of the economy and other de-
sirable characteristics ot prestressed construction. However, for
blast loading, consideration should be given to cast-in-place
construction so that full advantage may be taken of the 10-inch concrete
fill which was obviously intended to provide barrier protection against
radiation emitted by fallout on the roof. Thus for this sample evaluation
the roof structures are assumed to be cast-in-place. This change does
not significantly affect the general character of the structure.
The roof slab is assumed to behave as a one-way slab, spanning





1. Obtain Trial design.
a. Assume p
M
= P~ n = 10 psim so
= 5 for flexure
= 1.3 for shear
= 1.3 for diagonal tension
b. Trial depth of slab
For shielding purposes, this design utilizes a 10-inch
slab on 24-inch Tees. Try a 12-inch slab, assuming
d = 9 inches.
1 1 1
"










c. Flexural steel requirements
As an estimate of the required flexural resistance of the
member, the following equation, based on an idealized








p = peak loading overpressure














J6Q = percentage of tensile steel at midspan
j6 = percentage of tensile steel at support
f i = dynamic steel yield strength
d = effective depth of tension steel rein-
forcement
L = length of span






c e 0.072 fdy d
Let J6C
= J6e





Since the minimum steel requirement is 0.20% for shrinkage
and temperature reinforcement, try d = 6 inches; J.. e_. ,




. 072 (0 . 4) 5 x 10 4 x
( |g ) 2
q = 22.4 psi > 11.1 psi O.K.
Use #5 bars at 12 inches on center at mid-depth of the
slab,










V , = shear acting at a distance
d/2 or 0. 1 L away from the
support, whichever is smaller
f = concrete strength
a = width of slab (assume 12 in.)
d = effective depth of tension steel
and V
ult
= qv (L -0.2L)a (30)
where
q = shear resistance
v
L = length of span
then q = Q ' 22fcd
v
0.8L (3D
for V = 4000 psi
c
q = 0.22x4x10 x6/0.8x48
v
q = 136 psi > 11.1 psi O.K.
Therefore the slab will not fail in shear.
e. Check diagonal tension strength
qy
= 3.5/f-T (d/L) (a/b) (32)
where
q = resistance to diagonal tension
b = width of loaded area






q = 27.8 11.1 psi O.K.
y
Therefore the slab will not fail in diagonal tension
and no web reinforcement is required.





T = fundamental period of vibration
2
T 48
8.5 x 104 x 6 x 0.14
T = 0.0323 sec.
2. Obtain loading function
From Figure 3-8 in the Air Force Design Manual, a two-
triangle representation of the side-on overpressure function
may be obtained. In this two-triangle representation, it is
slightly conservative to ignore the drag component on the roof.
For a one-megaton surface burst and a peak side-on






= 1.0 - Cj
h = 0.3 sec.






Lt, ,t = duration of effective overpressure
triangles
For a ten-megaton surface burst the times above must be





















F.Jj = loading forces

















= 10.95 psi^ 11.1 psi O.K.
It could have been anticipated that the required yield
resistance would approximate that estimated in the trial
design. Whenever tj ^ 5, the design yield resistance
T








which was developed for a step pulse.
The side-on overpressure and range for a ten-megaton
surface burst which correspond to the calculated flexural
resistance can be obtained at this point if desired.
B. T-beams
Assume T-beams are poured monolithically with the exterior
wall so that they may be treated as essentially fixed at the ends. The
flexural rigidity of the bearing wall is much greater than that of the
fifty-foot span T-beam. As shown in Figure 17, the single Tees were
originally 24 inches deep and placed at 4 feet on centers.
1. Obtain trial design.
a. Assume p = p = 10 psi
m so
ji =5 for flexure





b. Trial depth of beam
Using the slab depth obtained above, and the 24-inch
depth of web shown on the architectural drawings,








As estimated in obtaining the trial slab design, for
a peak side-on overpressure of 10 psi and u = 5,
the flexural resistance required is about 11.1 psi.
The dead load of the slab is about 1. 1 psi, and that for
the stem is about 0.3 psi. Then the total design load
is 12.5 psi.
Assuming that the neutral axis is in the slab
Let J6,
= 0.072 itfc + /y fdy(l )'
= /L
(3)
then J6 = J6 = (12.5/0.144 x5 x 10 4)(6M) 2
c e 32








A = Area of tension steel required
s
A = 0.00615 x 48 x 32 = 9.45 in. 2
s
Use 12 #8 bars in three layers of four bars each in the
12-inch wide stem.
At the support, the required steel in the flanges








= width of stem






= 12.5/0.144 X5xl0 4<«> < 6°° >'
















Use 12 #8 bars irt the flange at the support.







_ = 0.22fL d aqv ^x X
0.8 L b





e. Check diagonal tension strength
qy
= 3.5/F(d) § (32)
q = 2.95 psi< 12.5 psi
Therefore web reinforcement is required.
The yield resistance of the T-beam with diagonal
tension reinforcement may be calculated from the following:
q = 100 (1 + J_ Ae )(_i )fiT(l+5?v £ )
y 2 j6
c
2 + » *
c 7o^ dy
i d x2 / a x
( r } { b ) (36)
where
q = diagonal tension resistance
j6 = j6 , calculated as for rectangular section
of width a(tf = 2.46%)
e
= ratio of compression to tension steel
at midspan ( & = 0)
)6 = percentage of web steel
a, b, d, L, V , and f , are as previously defined.
Try j6 = 0.50% (minimum web reinforcement)
v




q = 13.2 psi > 12.5 psi O.K.
y
f. Obtain fundamental period of flexural vibration
T 2
85,000d/2c~ (33)
T = (600) 2/8.5 x 10 x 3.2 x 10 x/0.615





2. Obtain loading function.
The loading function is the same as that for the slab (p. ).





-L = = 19.3
T 0.168





c. The required yield resistance can be obtained from
c
l





q = ioP^ + ^£\
f L1 - 04 0.92 J
q = 10.6 psi *= 11.1 psi O.K.
Thus the T-beams are satisfactory as designed.
C. Bearing wall
As shown on the architectural drawings, the bearing walls
are of 16-inch-thick grouted brick. Although a brick wall of these
dimensions is more resistant to blast than a conventional brick wall,
it cannot be relied upon to provide support for the roof at the 10 psi
overpressure level. A reinforced concrete wall is required. For blast
loading, the wall can be considered to behave as a one-way slab




multipurpose area can be considered as a one-way slab 8 feet high
by 12 inches thick, as shown below. The wall can be faced with
4-inch brick to provide required mass thickness and to maintain the
architectural treatment of the original design. No brick facing should










= 25 psi = p (reflected overpressure)
1. Obtain trial design.
a. Assume p
m
u =5 for flexure
u =1.3 for shear and diagonal tension
b. Trial depth, d = 9 inches
c. Flexural steel requirements
Let q. = p =25 psi for trial
m
= 0.072(0 + J6 ) f . (^)
2
c e dy L ' (3)
Let = A
fi. tfe












A = 0.432 in.
s
Use #6 bars at 12 inches on center in both faces at midspan
and at the supports. Although a thinner wall would suffice
for this case, the depth is needed to develop moment
resistance where the wall joins the roof. An effect which
is not considered here is that of the axial load in the wall
produced by loading on the roof. Because the shock wave
takes a finite time to travel across the roof, it is quite
possible that the moments and shears in the wall will
develop to their maximum values before the roof is entirely
loaded. Thus the effect of the axial load from the roof
may be conservatively ignored.
d. Check shear strength
q = 0.22i'n dV 0.8 L (31)




q = 103 psi > 25 psi O.K.
v
e. Check diagonal tension strength
q = 3 . 5 f ' ( f- )
y c
L (32)
q = 3.5 x 63.5 (^| )
q = 20. 8 psi < 25 psi
y
May need web reinforcement. (See step 4)






= 96/8.5 x 10 4 x 9/674"
= 0.019 sec.
2. Obtain loading function.
The peak reflected overpressure at 10 psi incident may
be calculated from the following expression:
= 2p
so











= peak reflected overpressure
= peak side-on overpressure
p = ambient atmospheric pressure
p°
= 2(10) |izJA£±AJUiL]
r 7 x 14. 7+10
p = 25. 3 say 25 psi
The duration of the spike of reflected overpressure cannot
be calculated exactly but may be conservatively assumed












U = velocity of shock front
For H =10 ft. and assuming U = 1400 fps
t = 0.0214 sec.
c
Using a total equivalent impulse duration of t. = 2.6 sec.
(obtained from Figure 3-7, Air Force Design Manual) an







Bearing wall loading function






















L^1 -'f [_1 .
4
0.91
q = 22 psi ~ 25 psi O.K.
4. Check web steel requirements.
Referring to the preceding calculations only the diagonal
tension strength of the wall appears less than 22 psi. Check
equation
q, = 100(1 + _L _*e_)(J ) JIT"
2 rf 2+* ' c c
Let * and/f =
(36)
2
q = 100(2. 5)(0. 5) 7l600 (1) (—=) (1)
y
" 96
q =44 psi > 22 psi O.K.
No web reinforcement is required, and the bearing wall is
satisfactory as designed.
D. Interior column
The columns at the north and south ends of the multipurpose
area support, through beam action, the 16-inch bearing wall designed
above and part of the roof load from the surrounding classroom areas.
As scaled from the drawings, the columns are 10 feet in height and





1. Obtain trial design.
For the trial design, use the indicated cross-section of
20 inches by 20 inches and assume a total percentage
of reinforcing steel of 2 per cent.
a. Check unsupported length
L/t <C 15 for short column
where
L = unsupported length of column
t = least width of column
120/20= 6 < 15 O.K.







P = axial load capacity of a dynamically
loaded column
f = dynamic concrete strength
dc
f , = dynamic steel yield strength
j6 = total percentage of reinforcement
A = area of concrete
c
then P = (0.85 x 5000 + (2/100) x 50 000) 400
u
P = 2,100,000 #
u
2. Obtain actual load.
a. Contributory dynamic load areas





4' x 18' x 10 psi x 144 = 104,000*
Roof over classrooms
6' x 18' x 10 psi x 144 = 156,000#
b. Dead and live load of structural elements
Slab and beams over multipurpose area
4' x 18' x 245 psf = 18,000#
Slab and beams over classrooms
6' x 18' x 170 psf = 18,000#
Bearing wall
8' x 18' x 1.33' x 150 pcf = 29,000#
Total load = 226,000#
Because of the particularly serious consequences of a column
failure when the column supports a roof subjected to blast
loading, the Air Force Design Manual recommends that the
resistance of the column be either twice the peak blast pressure
times the tributary roof area, or the maximum resistance of
the supported elements, whichever is smaller. In this case,
assume a total load of
226,000# x 2 = 452,000# < 2,100, 000# O.K.
Thus the columns are satisfactory as designed.
Thermal Evaluation
No major difficulties were encountered in upgrading the example





the fire effects of nuclear weapons. As the building is shown on the
drawings as being isolated from any serious exposure fire hazard, an
adjacent office building of five stories was assumed to be situated 100
feet from the school for example purposes. The thermal evaluation was
conducted using as a basis seven key elements concerned with thermal
protection, as outlined below.
1 . Site layout
The location of the structure allows good access for fire fighting
by outside sources. The building itself affords access to firemen and
equipment by means of the numerous windows and doors. Another
advantage is that the structure is situated on ground which slopes
gently away from the building.
Some dense vegetation is noted near the building. It is recommended
that such planting be avoided close to the structure, first, because of
the additional fire hazard, and second, because of the possibility
that it could obstruct fire-fighting equipment.
The parking lot, when filled to its capacity of 45 cars, each
having an assumed fire load of 500# (tires, gasoline, oil, grease,
paint, upholstery/ etc.) is situated 50 feet from the building and
exposes a fire resistive wall and one of the classrooms. An estimate
of the exterior fire exposure of the parking lot to the school is less
than two minutes.
It is assumed that a five-story office building is located 100




Exposure building situation (plan view)
Exposure building data:
Multistory office building, roof noncombustible.










In order to determine the exposure severity index of the office
building it is necessary to solve the equation




E = exposure severity index for exposure
eb
building









q = (RWF)(HF)(w ) (7)
eb eb
where
RWF = Roof and wall factor (Table 9)
HF = Heat factor (average wood equivalent
(Table 4)
w = weight of combustible material,
eb
psf of building surface
then q
,
= (0. 7)(1 . 0)(100xl80x5xl0/l00xl80+56x560)
eb
q , =12.7 psf
eb
Solving for F :
w










F = f(X,Y ) (Table 8) (22)
2 * &
X, = wh/d (23)









then X = 90/100 = 0.9
Y
1
= 5/100 = 0.05
Y
2
= (56 - 5)/100 = 0.51




= f(0.9, 0.51) = 0.168
and F = .019 + .168 = 0. 187
w






E = .238 hour, say 1/4 hour
e
Thus the exposure severity of the multistory office building to
the shelter is negligibly small so long as thin, combustible materials
are shielded. It can be seen in Table 2 that practically any load-bearing
masonry wall offers sufficient protection against a fire severity of 1/4
hour.
2. Structural considerations
It is indicated from rays sketched on both the elevation and
plan views of the building that thermal impingement is likely to occur
on the floor and all walls of the classrooms of the building. It is
recommended that attention be given to methods of shielding the
interior of the classrooms from these rays. This may be accomplished
through use of additional structural baffles or suitable drapes, as
well as by raising the sill height of the windows.
All conditions for life safety appear to have been met in the
original design of the corridors and exits of this structure. Shelter
storage is noted on the corridors, but it is assumed that compartmented,
locked, metal storage cabinets are utilized and that no unusual hazard
is presented here.
It is noted that hazardous areas of more than normal fire loading
are located adjacent to corridors in some cases. These areas must
be provided with fire resistant doors and partitions so that the escape
routes will not be subjected to this fire hazard.





This structure offers a high degree of compartmentation for the
containment of fire. In general, all compartments are protected with
a fire wall or a fire partition by virtue of the reinforced concrete con-
struction employed in the building. The use of reinforced concrete
bearing walls should offer a minimum of four hours fire resistance
which far exceeds the resistance required consistent with the fire load
presumed for the building.
Some improvements are needed in the kitchen, which is classified
as a hazardous area. It is recommended that the kitchen be provided
with additional fire resistant barriers to isolate it from the remainder
of the building. An alternate solution would be to place the kitchen
on an outside wall and better use the built-in fire protection afforded
by the fire resistive exterior walls.
4. Grouping of hazardous areas
In this design, the mechanical and electrical equipment rooms
have been separated from the main structure, which is desirable from
the thermal point of view, provided the separate installation has
adequate protection to prevent blast damage and the possibility of
secondary fires. Attention should be given to the janitors' storage
areas as well as the kitchen area, as mentioned above, to insure that
adequate protection is provided to prevent fire spread should it occur
in these hazardous areas.
5. Furnishings and materials of construction





occur, depending upon the materials which the thermal rays encounter.
No thin cellulosic materials should be used on surfaces, including
furniture, where the rays could impinge. If the use of acoustical tile
is planned, it should be of mineral fiber, and no combustible materials
should be used in its installation.
Fire resistant doors and partitions should be provided consistent
with the interior fire load index of each compartment, which can be
determined by the method outlined on pages 64 to 66 . The minimum
fire severity index anticipated in this building is 3/4 hour, which is
slightly higher than that indicated by a fire load index of 5 psf. Special
consideration in this matter should be given to hazardous areas such
as mechanical and electrical equipment rooms.
6. Firefighting from within
The layout of the building with its near symmetrical arrangement
of classrooms provides for convenient fighting of fire from within the
shelter by self-help processes. Extinguishers are shown on the plans.
Improvement of fire fighting from within would consist principally of
an increase in the amount and distribution of the fire-fighting equipment,
both active and passive.
Sprinkler protection should be provided in areas with more than
normal fire load, such as the kitchen area. The sprinkler system
should be provided with an independent water supply. In addition
to the sprinkler system, it is recommended that a hose system be





rooms on the east and west sides of the building.
Other self-help devices which should be provided include: a
pressurized water extinguisher at each corner of the multipurpose room,
two dry chemical extinguishers in the kitchen area, and a dry chemical
or carbon dioxide extinguisher in the mechanical room.
7. Smoke and heat venting
Smoke and heat venting of the classrooms is assumed to be
adequate by virtue of the doors and windows to the outside. However,
the plans do not indicate smoke-venting facilities for the main shelter
area. Should fire occur in the shelter or surrounding rooms it is necessary
that the products of combustion be disposed of immediately. Mechanical
smoke-venting installations can be installed if necessary. All standard
air handling equipment should be provided with heat and smoke sensing
devices and gasketed dampers to prevent circulation of the products of
combustion. Outside vent openings should be designed to resist
blast effects. Adequate noncombustible seals should be provided
around piping in risers and other openings to prevent the spread of
smoke and fire gasses.
Radiation Evaluation
All changes recommended to increase the blast and thermal
resistance of this structure either maintained or increased the mass
thickness and amount of baffling originally provided for protection from




originally designed for a high level of radiation protection, having a
protection factor of 100 or better, the protection factor is less
sensitive to change than it would be at lower protection levels. The
recommended structural changes for the subject building result in
corresponding changes in the protection factor which while favorable,
are of a magnitude somewhat less than 5%.
Architectural Considerations
All changes recommended to increase the resistance of the
structure to the integrated effects of nuclear weapons may be incor-
porated without altering the original functional and aesthetic character-
istics of the school. It should be possible to increase the fire resistance
of interior partitions and doors with no obvious changes in design.
Brick facing should be used on the exterior reinforced concrete walls






A. General description of the shelter concepts employed
The basic shelter concepts utilized in the school designs can be
categorized with more than one concept being used in some cases.
Three basic approaches were employed in the design of above-ground
shelters. These concepts are illustrated in Figure 19 and described
below:
1 . Core Shelter
This concept utilizes a core shelter area surrounded
by classrooms open to the outside. Solutions of this
type either provide the necessary wall mass thickness
in the interior partition around the shelter core or
utilize the mass thickness of the exterior wall in
conjunction with that of the interior partition.
2. Entire Building Shelter
In this case the entire structure is used as a
shelter with the required mass thickness being provided





3. Upper Story Shelter
This design incorporates shelter in the upper stories
of a multi-story structure with the required mass thickness
being provided by means of pivotable radiation/sun shields
For below-ground shelters two basic approaches were employed,
as shown in Figure 19.
1 . Underground Shelter
The entire structure is placed underground in this
approach. In some cases natural light was admitted
by wells around which the classrooms and offices were
clustered.
2. Basement Shelter
Two-story structures can be employed with one level
below ground (a basement). Another method utilizes a
depressed lower story which is surrounded by a moat
in order to limit the plane of fallout contamination.
A third variation of this concept employs two single-
story structures on a side-hill, each having one wall
(downhill) exposed and the other below ground.
The structural systems employed were more uniform than the
radiation shielding solutions. Without exception, the roofs over all
shelter areas were of reinforced concrete construction, and were
supported by either beams and columns or load bearing walls. Wall











. Underground Shelter (Elevation)
This scheme frequently used
with wells or depressed
courts for natural lighting
2. Entire Building Shelter (Plan) 2. Basement Shelter (Elevation)
X X X X X X XV
3. Upper Story Shelter (Elevation)
x x x x v x x
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brick or stone facing: or concrete block with and without facing materials.
In one design walls were indicated as stone and mortar.
B. Relative merits of the basic solutions
Of the above-ground concepts, the best solution is that which
incorporates the entire building as a shelter (Number 2 in Figure 19).
In this approach, the entire structure should be of reinforced concrete,
and designed such that it can withstand an incident side-on overpressure
of 10 psi. Subsequent to the arrival of a blast wave of this intensity
the entire structure would remain standing. The only damage anticipated
would be glass breakage in the doors, and these should be baffled to
prevent flying glass fragments from injuring the shelter occupants. This
concept also offers excellent protection from thermal radiation. The
primary disadvantages of this type of structure are that the classrooms
would not receive natural lighting (although this criterion may have
some advocates) and that it may reflect more expense than the core
shelter concept.
The core shelter is less expensive but also provides less total
shelter area. In addition, where there are large glass areas in the
exterior walls, the classrooms would be subjected to considerable
thermal radiation, which could result in a serious fire hazard. After
the arrival of the shock wave it may be assumed that the classrooms
surrounding the core will have been destroyed. This assumption is
based on the lighter roof, wall, and partition construction prevalent in





properly baffled entryways, would protect the occupants from flying
glass fragments and other missiles and, subsequently, from fallout
radiation.
The upper-story shelter is the least desirable approach for
several reasons. First, there is the problem of access and egress
under emergency conditions. Second, although it is possible to design
such a structure to withstand reasonably high overpressures, in all but
the most unusual circumstances, the structure would be more expensive
than a one-story building of the same floor area.
Below-ground shelters are inherently more resistant to blast
effects than above-ground shelters. However, since a practical
upper limit for an "open" shelter of about 10 psi exists, this advantage
is partially lost, as protection in this range can be incorporated into
19
above-ground shelters at reasonable expense. The principal advantage
gained by placing a portion of a structure underground is increased
protection against fallout radiation. For the same wall and roof mass
thickness the fallout protection afforded by a below-ground structure
is much greater than that for an above-ground structure.
9In a recently published work by C.S. White, Tentative
Biological Criteria for Assessing Potential Hazards from Nuclear
Explosions DASA 1462 (Albuquerque, N.M.: Lovelace Foundation for
Medical Education and Research, Dec, 1963), an overpressure of
about 12 psi (assuming a sharply rising pressure and a duration in
excess of 400 milliseconds) is indicated as the threshold of serious





While resistance to the three basic types of fire hazard accompany-
ing a nuclear explosion has been used as the basis of analysis of the
school designs, and should be the basis for the analysis or design of
any structure intended to resist the thermal effects of nuclear weapons,
certain key elements which could serve as guideposts for all fire-
resistant construction have become apparent. These key elements are
listed below, accompanied by a brief discussion of the function of
each in creating a fire resistive structure.
1 . Site layout
2. Structural considerations
3. Compartmentation and firestops
4. Grouping of hazardous areas
5. Furnishings and materials of construction
6. Firefighting from within
7. Smoke and heat venting
1 . Site layout
Spread of fire from a burning building to an adjacent shelter
by sustained radiation from the fire coupled with heat transfer by
convection is a considerable hazard. Exposure fires could be the
most important fire problem in the event of a nuclear attack. The
location of a structure is of fundamental importance from the stand-
point of the hazard of exposure fires. In this respect, the building
density or "builtupness" of an area, the type of structures which
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exist, and the width and nature of firebreaks must be considered.
The building should be placed in the most advantageous position to
minimize exposure from the surrounding properties. If it is not possible
to place the structure on an ideal site f protection from exposure fires
must be incorporated into the design considerations.
Dense vegetation should not be close to buildings, particularly
in the case of tall trees. In addition to creating a possible fire hazard
it could offer obstructions to fire- fighting equipment.
Stone or masonry fences, retaining walls, steep banks, or
pits could hamper fire-fighting efforts from outside sources, and may,
in the case of masonry fences, present a missile problem. Free standing
walls which are a part of the shielding should be kept a minimum of
12 feet from the structure depending on the access requirements of
local fire- fighting services.
2. Structural considerations
Thermal rays sketched on section views of the plans impinge
on the interior surfaces of structures shown in some designs.
Depending on the height of burst the ray strikes the wall or the floor,
the walls being more vulnerable to a surface burst. These thermal
rays could result in the ignition of thin combustible materials in the
interior of the structure. To minimize the effect of thermal rays








c. Increased sill height of windows
d. Drapes of noncombustible reflective material
e. Screening
f. Fire resistant material for all exposed areas
Where the threat of exposure fires exists, construction should
be such that the requirements to resist ignition by exposure fires as
outlined on pages 55 to 66 are satisfied.
Corridors and exists should satisfy building exit codes and
should be identified and kept clear at all times. Where shelter
storage is along corridors, it should be in compartmented, locked
metal storage cabinets. In underground structures for which no codes
have been developed, it is recommended that corridor and exit widths
be increased to compensate for the lack of windows which could be
used in fighting fires and for escape.
Poor housekeeping and storage conditions can create a consider-
able fire hazard, but the avoidance of structural features inviting
unusual storage can do much to eliminate this problem.
3. Compartmentation and firestops
Following the ignition of combustibles, limitations must be
placed upon the development and spread of fires to provide for the
safety of the building and its occupants. When the building is divided




compartment in which it originates. Separation of the building into
compartments is accomplished through use of fire walls or fire partitions.
Open plan or semi-open plan type of structures should be divided into
compartments to establish fire areas. The open type of structure
complicates fire protection, whatever the origin of the fire. Under
ordinary circumstances escape is possible to the outside of the building,
but under conditions of nuclear attack, reliance must be placed on fire
control by compartmentation.
It is of little use to specify compartmentation in a shelter only
to have the interior doors or walls removed by nuclear blast effects.
Were this to occur, flame and smoke might enter the shelter area and
the fire area or compartmentation concept would be lost, making control
of the fire difficult. It is desirable that some degree of blast resistance
be included in the compartmentation elements of a structure to reduce
this hazard. At the same time this would reduce the danger of fire
ignition due to secondary blast effects.
4. Grouping of hazardous areas
Hazardous areas are areas of more than normal fire load or
those where ignition of fires is most likely to take place, such as
mechanical and electrical equipment rooms, janitor storage rooms,
and kitchens. If such areas can be grouped, the probable number of
ignition points in a structure is lessened, and the fire compartmenta-




would be more convenient and less expensive to provide some form of
blast and fire resistant protection for these areas if they are grouped.
Finally, grouping of hazardous areas would assist in the economical
employment of a partial interior sprinkling system.
5. Furnishings and materials of construction
The selection of materials of construction for a shelter should
be based to some degree on room usage and the corresponding fire
load. The fire resistive properties of shelter materials should be
considered with the same attention that is paid to their strength
properties. A fire load should be developed for each compartment of
the structure so that the expected fire severity can be determined and
the required fire resistant materials used.
Selection of materials and furnishings for the interior of a
building can have a marked effect on the rate and degree of fire spread.
Ceiling and floor surfaces should be of noncombustible material/
or of material installed in such a manner that it would not contribute
to fire spread; and should leave no concealed spaces.
No thin cellulosic materials should be used on any surface ,
including furniture , which could be exposed to thermal radiation.
6. Firefighting from within
Sprinkler protection should be provided in areas with greater
than average fire loads. If these hazardous areas are grouped, a




has been proven effective in peacetime and should operate equally
well in a warfire environment. A dependable/ private water supply is
preferable to public distribution systems due to the danger of blast
damage. Other active measures such as hose systems and individually
operated fire extinguishing equipment should be available to extinguish
incipient fires which could occur through thermal ignition or other
causes. The capacity to eliminate small fires in the early stages is
of considerable importance in maintaining the integrity of the shelter.
7. Smoke and heat venting
In addition to protection from flame and radiant heat, attention
should be given to methods of protecting a shelter from the effects of
smoke/ dust/ and fire gasses. Heat and smoke venting should be given
specific attention in shelter design. Venting can be incorporated through
use of windows or doors where they extend to the ceiling. There is no
formula for smoke venting from ordinary fires, but an area of five
percent of the compartment area should be sufficient. Venting of
compartments around the shelter area should also be incorporated.
Smoke venting may also be accomplished through use of mechanical
smoke-venting installations.
Adequate noncombustible seals should be provided around
piping in risers and other openings to prevent the spread of smoke
and fire gasses. All installations normally used for handling air
should be equipped with heat and smoke sensing devices and gasketed





The requirements for mass thickness and shielding to increase
a structure's resistance to the blast and thermal effects of nuclear
weapons are generally of the same nature as the requirements for
protection against fallout radiation. Because of this, the changes
recommended to improve the resistance of the school designs to the
integrated effects of nuclear weapons (e._g_. , substitution of reinforced
concrete for concrete block walls, increased baffling of entranceways)
did not have adverse effects on the radiation resistance of the schools,







The analysis of the school fallout shelter designs clearly
indicates that significant increases in resistance to blast overpressures
and thermal hazards can be achieved with few and minor changes in
the basic architectural solution. Only a few structures would require
significant architectural modification. This increased resistance can
be achieved primarily by the use of reinforced concrete construction
for walls and interior partitions in the shelter area, with fire-resistant
design principles being incorporated as required.
In some cases, clerestories and other glass areas in the walls
surrounding the shelter must be eliminated, and more attention given
to the use of baffling to prevent inside damage to the shelter occupants
from flying glass fragments and other debris.
Below-ground shelters of both the basement and buried type
are inherently more resistant to blast and thermal hazards, and provide
more effective protection against fallout radiation than above-ground
shelters. However, the mass thickness required in the roof and walls
of an above-ground structure to meet fallout shielding criteria are
such that an overall blast resistance corresponding to 10 psi incident
overpressure and significant thermal protection can be achieved with
only minor modifications in designs incorporating fallout protection.
The increase from a blast resistance level of about 2 psi to
about 10 psi incident, with a corresponding increase in thermal




to the very large area between the 2 psi and the 10 psi overpressure
contours of a large yield weapon. A simpler way of stating this is
that the probability of survival for a structure having 10 psi shock
resistance and fire resistant construction is significantly greater
than that for a structure having 2 psi resistance without thermal
protection.
The area between the 2 psi and 10 psi overpressure contours
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